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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
the value of the property in the condition that it was at the time
of the sale, the mineral value was very properly considered in
this case. That value was definitely proved, as leases had been
given by defendant less than a month after they had acquired
title to the property and other conclusive evidence was available.
Justice Hawthorne, dissenting on the application of lesion 14 rules
to a "giving in payment," expressed no opinion on the question of
considering mineral value in determining price.
The court overruled an exception of no cause of action in
Wier v. Grubb.'-' Under the provisions of the original lease and
the sublease, defendants were obligated to develop further the
lease, and the existence of one producing well did not satisfy this
clause. Under Act 205 of 1938,16 "remedial and procedural in
character,"' 7 a mineral lessee may protect or defend his interest




Marriage in Violation of Article 99. Article 92 of the Civil
Code forbids priests, ministers, and magistrates to officiate at
the marriage of males under eighteen years of age and females
under sixteen years of age. Four years ago this article was in-
terpreted to impose merely a prohibition against the celebration
of such marriages, but not to render null such marriages as might
be celebrated in violation of its provisions.' By Act 312 of 1948,
Article 99 of the Civil Code was amended to prohibit priests, min-
isters, and magistrates from celebrating marriages before seven-
ty-two hours had elapsed from the issuance of the marriage li-
cense. The language used in Article 99 as amended is similar to
that found in Article 92, and in In re State in Interest of Goodwin2
the supreme court applied to Article 99, by analogy, its previous
interpretation of Article 92.
14. Arts. 1862, 1863, La. Civil Code of 1870.
15. 41 So.(2d) 846 (La. 1949).
16. Dart's Stats. (1939) H§ 4735.4-4735.5.
17. 41 So.(2d) 846, 847 (La. 1949).
18. Ibid.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. State v. Golden, 210 La. 347, 26 So. (2d) 837 (1946), discussed in Sym-
posium, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term
(1947) 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 165, 217 and noted in (1947) 7 LOUISIANA
LAW RBVIEW 442.
2. 214 La. 1062, 39 So. (2d) 731 (1949).
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Marriage of Insane Person. In Stier v. Price3 the plaintiff
wife sued for annulment of her marriage on two grounds: (1)
that her consent to the marriage had not been given freely in that
she would not have consented had she known of her husband's
insanity, and (2) that her husband was incapable of consenting to
the marriage at thet time of its celebration. The only provision
of the Civil Code on which the plaintiff could base her first
contention is Article 91, which declares in part "consent is not
free . . .when there is a mistake respecting the person, whom
one of the parties intended to marry." Following previous in-
terpretations of this provision, the court denied the contention
of plaintiff, stating that "mistake respecting the person" includes
only mistake in the identity of the person and does not include
mistake as to his qualities or attributes.4
The second contention of the plaintiff, that the defendant hus-
band was incapable of consenting to marriage at the time of the
ceremony was not as well argued or handled as it might have
been. One's capacity to consent should be distinguished from the
question of the validity of consent formally expressed. Vices of
consent can exist only if the person expressing consent has the
capacity so to do. Thus in Book III, Title IV, Chapter 2 of the Civil
Code, dealing with the requisites for the formation of a valid
contract, the introductory Article 1779 provides that the parties
must be "capable of contracting" and that "their consent [must
be] legally given." Thereafter follow Sections 1 and 2 of the chap-
ter, the first dealing with the capacity of persons to contract-
in which minority and insanity are treated as incapacities-and
the second dealing with the expression of consent and the circum-
stances which might vitiate the expression of consent, such as
error, fraud, and violence. In the same manner, in Article 90 of
the Civil Code, in the chapter entitled "How Marriages May be
Contracted or Made," it is specifically stated that the parties
must be "able to contract" and "willing to contract," capacity and
freedom of consent being thus distinguished. 5 Undoubtedly coun-
sel for the plaintiff wife wished to argue the insane person's in-
capacity to marry, for he cites and quotes from non-Louisiana
sources to this effect. In his brief, however, counsel phrased his
3. 214 La. 394, 37 So. (2d) 847 (1948).
4. Delpit v. Young, 51 La. Ann. 923, 25 So. 547 (1899), in which the al-
leged error "respecting the person" was as to the moral character of the
other person.
5. The French have had no difficulty in seeing this distinction. See
Trait6 6l6mentaire de droit civil de Marcel Planiol, I (4 ed. 1948) nos. 795-
797.
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argument in terms of the inability of an insane person to give a
free consent.6 Following this analysis, the supreme court seized
upon Article 110 of the Civil Code, under which that person only
whose consent was not free may sue to annul a marriage, and
denied the plaintiff's right of action.
Possibly counsel for plaintiff deliberately refrained from us-
ing Article 90 of the Civil Code. There are no other articles in
the chapter in which it appears stating rules for the application
of the principle there announced and counsel may have feared
the court would apply-as it had applied in the old case of Du-
casse's Heirs v. Ducasse-Articles 403, 1788, 1791, and 1794 of the
Civil Code. These articles, applicable to conventional obligations,
severely restrict the circumstances under which the ordinary con-
ventions of insane persons may be attacked and restrict the right
of action to the incapable or his representative. Certainly the
plaintiff would have lost her case had those articles been applied,
but their non-applicability could have been argued forcefully.
These articles are designed to protect the economic interests of
the two parties to an ordinary contract. The interest of the in-
capable is in being protected against his own disadvantageous
acts and against the advantage which may be taken of him by
others. The law ordinarily does not protect a fully capacitated
person against disadvantageous acts, unless economic duress or
fraud are involved, but it does seek to protect his interest in the
certainty of the binding force of agreements. Hence, while the
incapable is given the privilege of attacking an ordinary contract,
the party who has contracted with him may be certain of the
contract's binding force after a certain period, and even during
that period he may obtain this certitude by calling upon the
incapable's representative to approve or disapprove the agree-
ment. But marriage is not an ordinary contract; under Article 86
of the Civil Code it is regarded as a civil or secular contract as
opposed to a religious institution, but certainly it is much more
than an ordinary contract. In marriage the principal interests are
other than economic, and certainly it cannot be denied that the
capable person has an interest in annulling the marriage if the
other party proves to have been incapable of consenting thereto.
It would be inappropriate to apply articles designed for the pro-
tection of mere economic interests to situations in which eco-
nomic interests are not of primary importance and in which their
application could only be contrary to the real interests involved.
6. Brief of plaintiff and appellant, p. 4.
7. 120 La. 731, 45 So. 565 (1908).
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It should not be assumed, of course, that every insane person
is incapable of contracting marriage. Insanity is not of itself
an impediment to marriage like relationship within prohibited de-
grees, previous undissolved marriage, or disparity of race. Only
when the insanity is such that the person cannot understand the
meaning of consenting to marriage is that person without capacity
to contract or unable to consent. Whether or not the defendant
husband in the instant case had such capacity was not considered
by the court, the basis of its decision making this unnecessary,
and it need not be considered here.
Putative Marriage. Two opinions dealt with putative mar-
riage questions. In Holmes v. Triggs8 the issue was one of fact
simply, whether the evidence adduced supported the finding of
good faith. This needs no discussion. In Funderburk v. Funder-
burk the court repeated two points on the interpretation of the
requirement of good faith which now should be accepted, namely,
that good faith is simply an "honest and reasonable belief" in the
validity of the marriage and that the test of an "honest and rea-
sonable belief" is relative, depending on the facts and circum-
stances in each individual case. The second proposition was so
formulated in Succession of Chavis,10 decided in 1947, from which
the court quotes with approval. Unfortunately, the court also
mentioned, apparently with approval, the old test of good faith,
used in ' Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans" and in
Ray v. Knox,12 that good faith exists so long as the party has no
certain knowledge of the invalidity of the marriage. This should
cause no confusion, however, for the test announced in the Chavis
case and used in the instant decision is inconsistent with the
older standard and must supersede it.
Divorce and Separation
Intrastate Jurisdiction or Venue. There is no legislation ex-
cepting suits for separation and divorce for cause 13 from the gen-
eral rule of Article 162 of the Code of Practice requiring that the
defendant be sued in the parish of his domicile. It was on this
8. 214 La. 1083, 39 So. (2d) 739 (1949).
9. 214 La. 717, 38 So. (2d) 502 (1949).
10. 211 La. 313, 29 So. (2d) 860 (1947), discussed in Symposium (1948) 8
LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 189, at 217-218.
11. 1 La. Ann. 98 (1846).
12. 164 La. 193, 113 So. 814 (1927).
13. Divorce suits based on separation in fact, as distinguished from
those grounded on cause, may be brought in the parish of the plaintiff's
residence. La. Act 430 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2202].
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absolutely sound basis that Hymel v. Hymel 4 the supreme court
denied a plaintiff wife's claim to right to sue her husband for
separation from bed and board in a parish other than that of his
domicile;15 but the court added language which was totally unnec-
essary to the decision and which may lead to error in the future.
This dictum was to the effect that "the matrimonial domicile of
these parties was in Ascension Parish and the cause of action
arose there; therefore, the court of that parish would have juris-
diction in the instant case."'16 The fault with this language is
that it contains two implications, neither of which are valid, that
the parish of matrimonial domicile and the parish in which the
cause of action arises have some special importance in the deter-
mination of inter-parish jurisdiction or venue in intrastate sep-
aration and divorce cases. Matrimonial domicile was a concept
used in matrimonial cases before Williams v. North Carolina
I' to fix interstate legislative competence and judicial jurisdic-
tion for full faith and credit purposes. It is now outmoded for
such purposes and is used in interstate cases only when state law
employs it in voluntary limitation of the occasions on which it will
entertain separation or divorce suits with out-of-state elements.
An instance of this is the use of "matrimonial domicile" in Article
142 of the Civil Code. Nothing in Louisiana legislation justifies
the use of the "matrimonial domicile" concept in intrastate sepa-
ration and divorce cases. Nor is there any legislation which would
give any importance to the place in which the alleged cause of
action arises. In intrastate cases there is no question of the appli-
cability of Louisiana law and there would seem to be no reason to
distinguish the suit for divorce or separation from other personal
actions. The suit should be filed at the defendant's then domicile,'8
even if it be a parish other than that of the "matrimonial domi-
cile" or that in which the cause of action arose.
Another observation may be in order. The fact that the
supreme court treated the case as involving the question whether
the wife might sue for separation in the parish of her domicile,
as distinguished from that of her husband, implies that it op-
erated on the assumption that she could acquire an intrastate
or interparish domicile separate from that of her husband. Such
14. 214 La. 346, 37 So. (2d) 813 (1948).
15. The plaintiff wife sued in a, parish to which she had moved after
alleged cruelty on the part of her husband. On the possibility of a wife
acquiring an intrastate domicile other than that of her husband, see note on
the instant case (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 550, 552.
16 Italics supplied.
17. 317 U.S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279 (1942).
18. See note 1, above.
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an assumption is contrary to the clear statement contained in
Article 39 of the Civil Code, which Article is binding for inter-
parish or intrastate cases if not in interstate cases. The practice
of ignoring Article 39 in interstate domicile cases may be en-
tirely justified if one is willing to accept the proposition that a
state has no legislative competence in interstate questions; but
the judicial departure from Article 39 in interparish or intra-
state cases could not be justified in any manner.19
Divorce on Basis of Separation in Fact. Well understood and
well precedented interpretations of Act 430 of 1938,20 authoriz-
ing divorce on proof of two year separation in fact, were applied
in four cases. In Ridell v. Hyver 2' and Clark v. Clark22 the su-
preme court repeated its previous interpretation of the act in its
application to cases in which the defendant is insane. The sepa-
ration must be "voluntary" in its inception, though its continua-
tion need not be so; so a separation caused by insanity of the de-
fendant is not "voluntary," but a separation "voluntary" at its
inception is not affected by insanity of the defendant manifest-
ing itself after separation and prior to judgment of divorce.23
In Williams v. Williams24 it was repeated that fault is not an
issue in divorce cases based on separation in fact except to deter-
mine the wife's eligibility for alimony in those instances in which
the husband obtains the divorce. This is clear even from a cur-
sory reading of Act 430 of 1938 and Article 160 of the Civil Code.
Joly v. Williams25 involved only a question of fact, whether the
evidence supported a finding of two years separation.
Miscellaneous. Wendling v. Aucoin26 and Schneider v. Schnei-
der 27 involved questions of fact, whether the conduct complained
of constituted cruel treatment and therefore grounds for sepa-
ration from bed and board. In De.Maupassant v. Clayton5 an ad-
mission by the defendant that she had (knowingly?) contracted
a subsequent bigamous marriage with another was considered an
admission of adultery.
Evidence of Reconciliation. In the same case of De Maupas-
19. For further discussion of this case, see Note (1949) 9 LoUISIANA LAW
R vIEW 550.
20. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2202.
21. 215 La. 358, 40 So. (2d) 785 (1949).
22. 41 So. (2d) 734 (La. 1949).
23. The leading case is Leveque v. Borns, 174 La. 919, 142 So. 126 (1932).
24. 41 So. (2d) 736 (La. 1949).
25. 215 La. 312, 40 So. (2d) 476 (1949).
26. 216 La. 361, 37 So. (2d) 819 (1948).
27. 214 La. 759, 38 So. (2d) 732 (1949).
28. 214 La. 812, 38 So. (2d) 791 (1949).
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sant v. Clayton29 the supreme court denied that living in the
same house as the defendant (her stepmother's residence) con-
stituted evidence of cohabitation, and therefore of reconciliation,
with the defendant. Certainly cohabitation as husband and wife
is a question of fact, and presumably the record of proceedings
indicates that the plaintiff and defendant did not live together as
man and wife during this time. The writer is not of the opinion
that the instant decision, with its special facts, should be regard-
ed as a relaxation of the standard of old decisions, that is, that
evidence of separation is not to be sought behind closed doors.3 0
Alimony
Alimony Pendente Lite. In Coney v. Coney,31 an appeal
from a judgment for alimony pendente lite, the court indicated it
would have raised the amount of the award on the basis of the
evidence as of the time of judgment below, but refused to do so
because since that time the wife had ceased to be in need of
more. Technically speaking, evidence of the wife's increased in-
come should not have been considered on appeal. A change in
the circumstances of the parties is cause for a new suit for reduc-
tion or increase of alimony, but cannot possibly affect the cor-
rectness of a judgment rendered before circumstances changed.
The appeal should be considered on the merits of the case as of
the time of judgment below and if circumstances develop after
the judgment which may warrant a change in the amount of ali-
mony the party interested should seek an increase or reduction,
in the lower court, on the basis of the new facts. In this manner
the parties may be given some certainty that the amount award-
ed will reflect needs and circumstances of the time for which ali-
mony is payable. In the present case the wife possibly did not
receive sufficient alimony for the time prior to her acceptance
of employment to augment her income.
The root of the difficulty in the instant case, of course, is that
the husband had not sought a reduction of the award in lower
court on the basis of the changed circumstances. The increase
of the award on appeal would have meant making him liable at
that rate from the date of original demand and until he sought
redetermination of the amount in a new action. As a result, the
husband would have been made liable for amounts not needed
by the wife after her increase in income began. But to this ob-
29. Ibid.
30. See for example, Singleton v. Rogers, 160 La. 195, 106 So. 781 (1926).
31. 41 So. (2d) 497 (La. 1949).
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jection the writer would answer that proper legal procedure
to correct the situation was available to the husband and his coun-
sel and that they failed to make use of it. And, as mentioned
before, in this case the supreme court's decision possibly operated
to deprive the wife of an amount to which she was entitled be-
fore her increase in income, an amount which she will never
receive.
In Hand v. Hand32 the question was simply whether the evi-
dence adduced at the trial was sufficient to justify the amount
awarded by the lower court. In Reich v. Grieff3 3 the issue was
again one of evidence, but here the fact that the husband and
wife had never lived together after marriage might indicate such
fault on the part of the wife as would bar her from claiming ali-
mony under Article 160 of the Civil Code. The supreme court
considered the evidence relevant and remanded the case for fur-
ther hearing on the question of fault.
Alimony After Divorce. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code,
alimony after divorce on the ground of separation in fact for two
years or more is obtainable by the wife against whom the divorce
has been rendered only if she has not been at fault. In Haw-
thorne v. Hawthorne3 4 the supreme court sustained the district
judge's ruling that under this article the wife is not entitled to
alimony in a situation in which both husband and wife are at
fault. The article makes the wife's freedom from fault a condi-
tion for her recovery of alimony. The mere fact that the hus-
band as well may have been to blame is no reason to deny the
application of Article 160. The same issue was presented and
apparently decided in the same way as Sampognaro v. Sam-
pognaro.3 5
Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction. The distinction between
proceedings for alimony under the Civil Code and those under
Criminal Code Articles 74 and 75 was clearly made in State v. Gal-
jour.36 Failure to support one's minor child in need is a crime
under the first article and under the second the judge may, in
lieu of criminal punishment, order the convicted father to. pay ali-
mony in certain amounts. In the instant case, a father so con-
victed excepted to the juvenile court's right to fix his alimony lia-
bility to his children. The ground relied on was that he was al-
32. 214 La. 1023, 39 So. (2d) 719 (1949).
33. 214 La. 673, 38 So. (2d) 381 (1949).
34. 214 La. 905, 39 So. (2d) 338 (1949).
35. 41 So. (2d) 456 (La. 1949).
36. 41 So. (2d) 215 (La. 1949).
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ready obligated to pay such alimony under a judgment of the
civil district court and, that court already having assumed juris-
diction, the juvenile court could not enter an order in the same
matter. The opinion of Justice Hawthorne correctly distin-
guishes between the criminal and civil proceedings in the res-
pective courts and maintains their independence from each other.
The order of the juvenile court under Article 75 of the Civil
Code is in lieu of criminal punishment by fine or imprisonment.
As such, it can only follow conviction for criminal failure to sup-
port the children, which conviction in turn can come about only
if the father has failed to fulfill his obligation to support them,
whether this obligation was fixed by civil court order or not.
Only actual support of the dependents will be a defense to the
criminal action. The existence or non-existence of a civil judg-
ment to pay alimony of itself has no bearing in the criminal pros-
ecution or liability thereunder.
Filiation
Acknowledgment of Illegitimates. Two questions on the
acknowledgment of illegitimates were raised in State v. De La-
vallade.37 The first issue was whether, in the absence of "formal"
acknowledgment of an illegitimate child under Article 203 of
the Civil Code, proof of an "informal" acknowledgment will
suffice to entitle the child to inherit from relatives. The court
decided in the affirmative, relying on its previous decisions to
this effect.38 Although the opinion does not make this clear, it
must be assumed that the acts constituting "informal" acknowl-
edgment occurred after 1870, for the deceased was a misce-
genous child and under Article 221 of the Code of 1825 only
"formal" acknowledgment might be admitted in favor of chil-
dren of color.
The second issue involved the application of Article 204 of
the Civil Code, which renders impossible the acknowledgment
of illegitimates whose "parents were incapable of contracting
marriage at the time of conception." The state contended that
under this article the deceased could not have been acknowledg-
ed, having been born of a negress and a white man. The court
apparently was of the opinion that Article 204 would prohibit
the acknowledgment of miscegenous illegitimates, but denied its
application in this case. The rationale of the decision was that
the deceased had been born in 1864, a date at which the law did
37. 215 La. 123, 39 So. (2d) 845 (1949).
38. The leading case is Taylor v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 91 So. 635 (1920).
1950]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
not prohibit the acknowledgment of miscegenous children (al-
though miscegenous marriages were then forbidden), and that to
apply the provisions of the Code of 1870 to the deceased would
be to give it retroactive effect in violation of Article 8 of the
Civil Code.
Undoubtedly the correct result under the facts was reached
in this case, but it is at least arguable that Article 204 of the
Civil Code does not prohibit the acknowledgment of misce-
genous illegitimates. The article prohibits the acknowledgment
of children "whose parents were incapable of contracting mar-
riage at the time of conception," but under the provisions of the
Revised Civil Code of 1870 as originally enacted miscegenous
marriages were not prohibited and therefore miscegenous chil-
dren could be acknowledged. Act 54 of 1894 did amend Article
94 of the Civil Code to prohibit the marriages of whites and per-
sons of color, but this fact alone, if enough to warrant, does not
compel the conclusion that Article 204 should now be interpret-
ed in such a manner as to make acknowledgment even more dif-
ficult than it was under the Code of 1825.
Presumption of Legitimate Filiation. Smith v. Smith89 in-
volved only a simple application of Article 184 of the Civil Code,
which presumes the husband of the mother to be the father of
the child conceived during marriage.
Paternal Authority and Tutorship, (Including Custody)
Authority Over Illegitimates. Of all areas of family law,
that of paternal authority and tutorship, and the relation of cus-
tody to each, is probably the least understood. A new, shining
bit of evidence of this fact is the case of State ex rel. Brook-
shire v. Brookshire,40 A wife and mother brought habeas corpus
proceedings against the husband and father, from whom she was
separated in fact, to regain custody of their five year old child, a
child born before their marriage and conceived while the father
was married to another woman. Custody was awarded to the
mother. The result-undoubtedly for the best interest of the
child-was entirely justifiable under the law as it was at the time
of the proceedings below, but not for the reasons assigned in the
opinion of the supreme court.
First, it should be pointed out that the district judge and the
supreme court both properly handled this case as a contest over
the custody of an adulterous illegitimate, the child being such
39. 214 La. 881, 39 So. (2d) 162 (1949).
40. 214 La. 289, 37 So. (2d) 711 (1948).
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at the time of the habeas corpus proceedings. Had the contro-
versy arisen after the effective date of Act 482 of 1948, amend-
ing Civil Code Article 198, the child would have been legitimate
and it would have been necessary to decide the case on that
basis.41 The brief of the relator-appellee was filed, argument
made, and opinion delivered after the effective date of the Acts
of 1948, but of course this could not affect the correctness of the
judgment rendered below before that time. If the respondent-
appellee derived any rights from Act 482 of 1948, the proper pro-
cedure for him to follow would have been to institute habeas
corpus proceedings on that basis. But the opinion is not justi-
fiable under the law as it stood prior to 1948 and, because of the
possible effect it may have in the future as "precedent" or "juris-
prudence," the writer feels compelled to discuss it.
The case should have been decided by the application of two
very simple provisions of the Civil Code. Under Article 337
the tutor is entitled to the custody of the minor and under Article
256 the mother is entitled to the tutorship of an illegitimate child
not acknowledged by the father. The child being adulterous
and therefore unacknowledgeable by the father, there should
have been no question about the mother's right to the tutorship
of the child and therefore to its custody.
Instead of handling the case in the simple manner outlined
above, the court-following the brief of the relator-appellee-
based its opinion on Articles 238 and 245 of the Civil Code:
"Art. 238. Illegitimate children generally speaking, be-
long to no family, and have no relations; accordingly they
are not submitted to the paternal authority, even when they
have been legally acknowledged."
"Art. 245. Alimony is due to bastards, though they be
adulterous and incestuous, by the mother and her ascen-
dants."
Counsel for the relator-appellee argued-and the supreme court
agreed-that the exclusion of illegitimates from paternal authori-
ty leaves the negative pregnant that such children must be sub-
ject to maternal authority, and that Article 245 is further evi-
dence of the lack of the father's authority over incestuous and
adulterous illegitimates. These arguments are in conflict with
the basic structure of our law on the authority over minors.
41. Under Act 482 of 1948, amending Article 198 of the Civil Code, adul-
terous illegitimates are legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their
parents with each other if both acknowledge them, formally or informally,
before or after marriage. All requisites were fulfilled in the instant case.
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"Paternal authority" and tutorship are simply two forms of
the authority over the custody of minors and their juridical rep-
resentation. During marriage and as long as the parents are not
separated from bed and board, the authority over the legitimate
minor children of the marriage belongs to both parents, with the
authority of the father prevailing over that of the mother in
case of a difference of opinion. It is this authority over the
custody and representation of legitimate minors which is known
as "paternal authority. '42 "Maternal authority," in the sense in
which it was used in the instant case, has no existence in our law.
Wherever "paternal authority" ceases or does not exist, either
because of the death of one or both parents, or their divorce or
separation from bed and board, or because the children are ille-
gitimate, the regime of tutorship begins. 43
The failure of counsel and court to use legislation which
would have enabled them to reach the result sought by each can-
not be deliberate and could hardly be the result of oversight.
The writer believes the cause is twofold: first, the practice of
dealing with custody cases independently of the question of tu-
torship, a practice now so widespread that our judges and attor-
neys seem to forget that the one is an aspect of the other; and
second, the dangerous practice of looking to decisions rather than
to legislation for the basic law-in this case to the ancient deci-
sion of Acosta v. Robin.44 This case, a contest between a mother
and a father over the custody of an illegitimate child, was de-
cided in 1829, but under the Code of 1808. That code did not con-
tain a provision corresponding to Article 256, the first such provi-
sion appearing as Article 274 of the Code of 1825. Justice Porter,
being unable to find any legislation on the tutorship of illegiti-
mates in the Code of 1808 and yet being faced with the problem
of finding a legislative basis for his decision, stretched the article
in the Code of 1808 corresponding to the present Article 238 and
gave custody of the illegitimate child to its mother. In spite of
the fact that Acosta v. Robin could not and cannot have any
meaning under the Codes of 1825 and 1870, both of which contain
articles on the tutorship of illegitimates, that decision has been
cited and quoted in custody cases ever since. The legislative re-
form of 1825 still awaits discovery.
Custody After Separation or Divorce. In two new cases,
42. See Arts. 215-226, La. Civil Code of 1870.
43. See Arts. 157, 246 and 337, La. Civil Code of 1870.
44. 7 Mart. (N.S.) 387 (La. 1829).
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Johnson v. Johnson4 5 and Roshto v. Roshto,46 the supreme court
once more47 expressed its disapproval of the practice of dividing
custody between separated or divorced parents, emphasizing the
need for continuous control by a single parent; but at the same
time the court specifically affirmed the natural right of the par-
ent not awarded custody to visit the child at reasonable times.
Sampognaro v. Sampognaro48 involved only an application of
Article 157 of the Civil Code consistent with the supreme court's
practice of presuming that, after separation or divorce, it is to
the greater advantage of the children to place them in the cus-




The proper interpretation of a provision in a partnership
agreement relative to the distribution of "capital and effects" on
the death of a partner was one of the problems in Succession of
Conway.' The widow of a deceased partner contended the agree-
ment contemplated a distribution of the value of the partnership's
business good will as well as other assets. The surviving partners
denied this contention. Whether the agreement in question, an-
alysed as a whole, did or did not contemplate the inclusion of
good will among the "capital and effects" or "assets and effects"
of the partnership is a question of fact which need not be con-
sidered here and which should not be considered without a re-
view of the record. The supreme court, however, agreed with the
widow's interpretation on the theory that good will was as much
"partnership property" as capital assets, citing out-of-state au-
thorities to this effect. Civil Code Articles 2808 and 2809 recognize
good will as an asset, even one which may be the contribution of
a partner to the total assets of the partnership.
Agency
The only agency case which need be mentioned is Morgan
v. Cedar Grove Ice Company, Incorporated.2 According to this
45. 214 La. 912, 39 So. (2d) 340 (1949).
46. 214 La. 922, 39 So. (2d) 344 (1949).
47. See Pierce v. Pierce, 213 La. 475, 35 So. (2d) 22 (1948), and the writer's
remarks thereon (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 201.
48. 41 So. (2d) 456 (La. 1949).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 41 So. (2d) 729 (La. 1949).
2. 41 So. (2d) 521 (La. 1949).
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